

# CITING INFLUENCE: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF QUOTATIONS AS TOOLS OF MANIPULATION IN TANZANIAN POLITICS

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## Abstract

This article examines the use of strategic misquotation by Members of Parliament (MPs) during ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. Grounded in pragma-dialectics, the study focuses on the extent to which strategic misquotation can be manipulative and fallacious. Analysis of Hansard transcripts of parliamentary debates in Kiswahili based on annual ministerial budget speeches reveals that MPs employ strategic misquotation to manipulate their political opponents and the electorate. The article argues that strategic misquotation is fallacious when it manipulates the propositional content of the relevant quotation and constitutes a derailment of strategic manoeuvring. The study highlights that authority argumentation could be a reasonable argumentative move or a fallacious rhetorical strategy. Misquotations usually constitute manipulation of the actual quotations and could thus be fallacious. The article concludes by suggesting that MPs employ strategic misquotation to achieve various political motives in favour of their political group.

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**Keywords:** Strategic misquotation, Members of Parliament, pragma-dialectics, fallacious, propositional content

## Introduction

Quotation is “one mechanism by which we can mention” [...] (Saka, 1998: 113). Saka (1998) maintains that quotation is used when one attributes exact expressions or views to someone else or distances oneself from a particular expression. Quotation may also be used “for indicating titles”, “expressing irony”, or “explaining truth” (Saka, 1998: 113), among other functions. In media discourse, quotation may be employed by journalists with the purpose of certifying, criticizing, evaluating, or validating information (Nylund, 2003; Volynets, 2013).

However, in various communicative activity types, including parliamentary debates, quotation can be employed not only to reinforce a party’s own position or viewpoints but also attack the other party’s position or viewpoints in the most effective manner (Constantinescu, 2012). This view is shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by Antaki and Leudar (2001). Based on the corpus of data from the British House of Commons, Antaki and Leudar (2001: 467) observe that members of parliament (henceforth MPs) can use “opponents’ words to promote their own arguments”. Similarly, quotation may be employed to support dissociative definitions when a party in a discussion wants to distance oneself from certain concepts or words with pejorative implications which the party may not wish to associate oneself with. This can be achieved by quoting an influential or respected public figure who shares the same or similar view in order to reinforce one’s argumentation (Hoinărescu, 2018;

Msagalla, 2020). Walton and Macagno(2011)further indicate that a party in a dialogue usually exploits a quotation from the opponent to criticise the other party and accuse them of inconsistency. In a similar vein, MPs in the Tanzanian parliament may quote their political adversaries or other sources to support their own viewpoints or criticise the viewpoints of their political opponents(Msagalla, 2020).

Although quotation seems to constitute an effective and powerful tool of argumentation and persuasion in political discourse, it is, more often than not, manipulative and thus fallacious, as it usually involves misquotation(Msagalla, 2020; Walton & Macagno, 2011). Through strategic (mis)quotation, one party may capitalise on only one detail of the other party's quotation, especially the one that supports this arguer's position, and completely ignore other (important) details which are not favourable to the speaker's position. In addition, quotation may be used out of context for political gain(Msagalla, 2020).Taking into consideration the manipulative nature of quotation and the possibilities for misquotation in parliamentary debates, this article sets out to find out how Tanzanian MPs effectively employ quotation as an argumentative (or rhetorical) strategy by exploring the possibilities for strategic (mis)quotation to result inmanipulation of the propositional content of the relevant quotation.In this article the term quotation is viewed both as synonymous with the noun 'quote' (which can be pluralised) and as the act of quoting something from someone or a specific source.Structurally, just like a quote, a quotation could be a sentence, a phrase, or a single word (Volynets, 2013).

### **Quotation and Authority Argumentation in Pragma-Dialectics**

In critical discussions, arguers may use various mechanisms to back up what they are saying or refute what other people are saying in order to resolve a difference of opinion in their favour. In pragma-dialectics, these mechanisms, which constitute one of the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring (alongside topical potential and audience adaptation), are known as 'presentational devices'(van Eemeren, 2010). Quotation is one of many presentational devices that can be used to reinforce a party's standpoint or attack another party's standpoints in a critical discussion. Apart from functioning as a presentational device, quotation in pragmadialectics is also considered to constitute an argumentation scheme – authority argumentation. It is considered a type of authority argumentation because, with the use of this device, one party in a critical discussion appeals to (the opinion or viewpoint of) an authority to support their standpoints or criticise the other party's standpoints(Hoinărescu, 2018; Msagalla, 2020).An authority could be an influential public figure, a legal, political, or religious document, a thing(Nyanda, 2016), and the like. For instance, in parliamentary discourse, quotations from legal documents usually back up one party's standpoint, "while simultaneously reminding the assembly of past commitments" (Constantinescu, 2012, p. 272).

Authority argumentation may take different forms and could be analysed under different names, including argumentation from authority, argumentation from expert opinion, argumentation from invested opinion, or experience-based authority argumentation (Wagemans, 2011; Wierda, 2015). However, the present article analyses a species of authority argumentation known as authority argumentation

by quotation. In this subtype, a standpoint is defended by quoting an influential figure, a document, or anything deemed authoritative. Through authority argumentation by quotation, a standpoint

may also be called into question by quoting certain words or views which contradict the propositional content of the relevant standpoint. Authority argumentation could be a reasonable argumentative move or a fallacious rhetorical strategy (Constantinescu, 2012; van Eemeren, 2010). It is reasonable if it is applied correctly by appropriately appealing to the relevant argumentation scheme – argumentation from authority. It is fallacious if it violates the argumentation scheme rule or derails the strategic manoeuvring. This suggests that, when authority argumentation by quotation is used inappropriately or incorrectly, it does not only violate the argumentation scheme rule but it also constitutes a derailment of strategic manoeuvring. The argumentation supported by this quotation is therefore considered fallacious. Furthermore, authority argumentation “could be abusively used, leading to what is called *argumentum ad verecundiam*” (Constantinescu, 2012: 265). Misquotations could also constitute fallacies such as straw man and *ad hominem* (Constantinescu, 2012). In the evaluation of a critical discussion, fallacies are considered unacceptable argumentative moves (Constantinescu, 2012; van Eemeren, 2010). Thus, in pragma-dialectics, the manipulation of quotations could be fallacious if it results in the violation of the discussion rules and/or derailment of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2010, 2018). Misquotations usually constitute manipulation of the actual quotations and could thus be fallacious. Manipulation of quotation is considered a frequent rhetorical strategy in argumentative discourse (Constantinescu, 2012). As further argued by Constantinescu (2012), some quotations maybe accepted without reservations but others may be challenged. Because the selected instances of strategic (mis)quotation from the Tanzanian parliament constitute manipulation of the propositional content of the actual quotations, they are actually put into question by members of the opposite political group.

### **Methodology**

Since “Hansard is a resource for arguments” in the parliament (Antaki & Leudar, 2001: 470), the study mainly employed a desk review of Hansard transcripts of parliamentary proceedings as collected from the website of the Tanzanian parliament ([www.parliament.go.tz/hansardslist](http://www.parliament.go.tz/hansardslist)). In the selection of the data which are relevant for the present analysis, the researcher first studied all Hansard transcripts in the fiscal years between 2013/14 and 2015/16. The selection of the relevant data with instantiations of strategic (mis)quotation was then done purposively. Thus, the excerpts that are analysed in this article include instances in which MPs appeal to a legal document (the constitutional review act) as an authority. Other excerpts involve instances in which MPs associate their arguments with the political statements from an election manifesto (i.e., CHADEMA’s 2010 election manifesto). There is also an excerpt in which an MP allegedly quotes one of the most influential historical political figures in Tanzania and Father of the Nation, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, as an authority. Based on the nature of political confrontation in the selected debates, in these excerpts the contributions are made by MPs from only two opposing sides: CCM as the ruling party and CHADEMA as the main opposition party.

In data analysis and discussion, the study employs the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. This theory is most suitable for examining the empirical argumentative reality in resolving differences of opinion in confrontational communicative activity types such as parliamentary debates where adversarial political groups engage in political discussions which usually involve confrontational exchanges of viewpoints before making informed collective decisions on the issues under discussion through (practical) argumentation (Fairclough, 2018; Ilie, 2018). In pragma-

dialectics, argumentation is viewed as a means of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits by testing the acceptability of the standpoints expressed by one party against the other party's criticisms through a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003).

Apart from functioning as a theoretical framework, the pragmadialectical theory also offers four analytic operations in reconstructing argumentative discourse in various communicative activity types including parliamentary debates. The analytic transformations include addition, deletion, permutation, and substitution (van Eemeren et al., 2014). These operations were applicable to the reconstruction of the argumentative discourse that accommodates instances of strategic (mis)quotation from the selected annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. In the next section, I analyse and discuss such instances of strategic (mis)quotation from two annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

### **Data Analysis and Discussion**

This section analyses and discusses four instances of strategic (mis)quotation from the two parliamentary debates on the annual ministerial budget speeches. The first instance comes from the parliamentary sub-debate on the constitutional review process as presented in Excerpt 1. This sub-debate is part of the parliamentary debate on the annual ministerial budget speech by the then Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs, Mr Mathias Chikawe, during the 2013/14 fiscal year. Earlier in his speech, Mr Chikawe had suggested that the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs (henceforward the Ministry), through the Constitutional Review Commission (hereafter the Commission), coordinated the constitutional review process effectively. However, Mr Tundu Lissu, the then Shadow Minister and opposition spokesperson for the ministry, is of the view that the ministry did not coordinate the process as required by the Constitutional Review Act (henceforth the Act). Specifically, Mr Lissu claims that the ministry, through the Commission, did not adhere to the Act because various (sub)sections of the Act were violated. One of these (sub)sections is (sub)section 7(1), as indicated in Excerpt 1 below.

#### **Excerpt 1**

MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [...] [1] Kwanza kabisa, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu cha 7(1) cha Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, Tume ina Wajumbe wasiozidi thelathini pamoja na Mwenyekiti na Makamu Mwenyekiti wake. [2] Kwa maana hiyo, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua uhalali wa maombi ya shilingi bilioni 12.193 kwa ajili ya posho za vikao kwa Wajumbe

34 wa Tume wanaotajwa katika kijifungu 210321 cha kasma

210300 kwenye randama ya Fungu 08 linalohusu Tume. [3] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua Wajumbe hawa wanne wa ziada ni akina nani na wameteuliwa lini kuwa Wajumbe wa Tume? [4] Aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kuelezwa, inakuwaje Tume iwe na Wajumbe 34 wakati Sheria iliyoiunda inataka Tume yenye Wajumbe wasiozidi thelathini? (Hansard transcripts, 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2013)

HON. TUNDU A.M. LISSU: [...] [1] First of all, in accordance with section 7(1) of the Constitutional Review Act, the Commission consists of not more than thirty members including the chairperson and deputy chairperson. [2] For this reason, the opposition camp wants to know the justification for requesting TZS 12.193 billion as sitting allowance for 34 Commission members mentioned in sub-vote 210321 of vote 210300 in Section 08 regarding the Commission. [3] The official opposition camp wants to know; who are these four additional members and when were they appointed as



Commission members? [4] Also, the official opposition camp wants to know why the Commission has 34 members while the Constitutional Review Act stipulates that the Commission shall have not more than thirty members!

In order to defend his claim that the ministry did not adhere to the Act, in Excerpt 1 Mr Lissu quotes the specific subsection of the Act which was allegedly violated. He claims that, according to the (sub)section 7(1) of the Act, the Commission members are only 30. He thus questions the justification for requesting TZS 12.193 billion to pay sitting allowance to '34' Commission members as indicated in the minister's annual ministerial budget speech, instead of requesting a reasonable amount of funds to pay only '30' Commission members as allegedly required by the Act. The basis of Mr Lissu's claim is that the ministry is requesting more funds to pay sitting allowance to four additional officials who are not Commission members because the Commission, according to Mr Lissu's quoted provision of the Act, has only 30 members, including the chairperson and the vice chairperson. In Excerpt 2 below, the minister responds to Mr Lissu's claim.

Excerpt 2

(a)

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AZIRI WA SHERIA NA KATIBA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, hoja ya kwanza ilikuwa ni uhalali wa malipo ya Shilingi bilioni 12.1 kwa ajili ya posho ya vikao kwa ajili ya Wajumbe 34 wa Tume. [2] Wajumbe wa Tume hawapo 34, Wajumbe wa Tume wapo 32. [3] Wapo Wajumbe 30, halafu wana Mwenyekiti wao na Makamu wake. [4] Walioweka ngazi sawa na Wajumbe hawa, ni Katibu na Naibu wake, unapata watu 34. [5] Lakini Wajumbe wa Tume hawapo 34. [6] Kwa hiyo, kama ilitolewa picha hiyo, basi picha hiyo siyo sahihi ni picha potofu. [7] Wajumbe wenyewe pamoja na Mwenyekiti wao na Makamu ni 32, halafu wanaongezwa juu yao ambao wako katika level sawa, kwa maana ya kulipwa posho sawa, ni Katibu na Naibu wake. [8] Kwa hiyo wanakuwa watu 34 katika ngazi sawa. [9] Sasa kama waliitwa wote ni Makamishna, basi ni makosa kwa sababu wote siyo Makamishna, [10] ila sasa posho hizi ndiyo zile ambazo zimepangwa na kukubaliwa kimsingi, kwamba watalipwa posho hii. [11] Zimekubalika na Sheria za Fedha [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

MINISTER FOR CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: [...]

[1] Honourable Speaker, the first concern was the justification for paying TZS 12.1 billion to 34 Commission members as sitting allowance. [2] The Commission members are not 34; they are 32. [3] There are 30 members, then the chairperson, and the vice chairperson. [4] Those who are at the same level as the Commission members are the secretary and the deputy secretary, making 34 members in total. [5] But the Commission members are not 34. [6] So, if that is what is portrayed, it is incorrect. [7] Members [of the Commission] themselves plus their chairperson and vice chairperson are 32, and in terms of being paid the same amount of allowance at the same level, there are the secretary and the deputy secretary. [8] So, they are 34 people who are at the same level. [9] Now, if they are all called commissioners, then it is wrong because not all of them are commissioners, [10] but this allowance is primarily in the approved budget, stipulating how much these people are supposed to be paid. [11] It is acceptable on the basis of the financial laws [...]

In Excerpt 2 above, the minister refutes Mr Lissu's claim that the Commission members are 30. He argues that the Commission members are 32. The minister's statement suggests that Mr Lissu either misquoted the provision of the Act or misinterpreted it. In order to justify whether Mr Lissu's

strategic quotation of the Act is indeed a misquotation (or misinterpretation) of the very Act, one key question should be answered: What does the Act really say about the number of Commission members? According to (sub)section 7(1) of the Act, “[the] Commission shall consist of: (a) a Chairman; (b) a Vice-Chairman; and (c) not more than thirty and not less than twenty other members” (URT, 2012, p. 8). Therefore, the correct interpretation of the cited provision suggests that the Commission members can range from 22 to 32 (Msagalla, 2020: 211). It is indeed a misquotation to claim that the Act stipulates that the Commission members are only 30. Mr Lissu may be accused of manipulating the propositional content of the cited provision of the Act and his authority argumentation by quotation could thus be fallacious. The motive behind Mr Lissu’s strategic misquotation could be to present the CCM government as a corrupt government which spends huge public funds to pay sitting allowances even to officials who are not Commission members in order to protect its political interests in the constitutional review process.

While Mr Lissu’s authority argumentation by quotation could be considered fallacious and manipulative, the minister still needs to explain why the ministry requests funds to pay sitting allowance to ‘34 Commission members’ instead of 32, as required by the Act. Thus, in line [4] and lines [6-8], the minister offers a usage declarative. He argues that there are other two people who are ‘not commissioners’ but have the same status as the commissioners in terms of remuneration. These are the secretary and the deputy secretary of the Commission. In this usage declarative, the minister introduces the term commissioners to make a distinction between the Commission members and members of the Secretariat. This usage declarative constitutes argumentation from (dissociative) definition. The minister provides a narrower definition of the term Commission members. Implicitly, he defines Commission members as commissioners. With this definition, the term

Commission member does not refer to members of the Secretariat (the secretary and deputy secretary), who are, according to this definition, not commissioners. Thus, in lines [6] and [9], he insists that it is wrong to refer to non-commissioners as Commission members. However, the Act does not explicitly stipulate whether the secretary and deputy secretary, as members of the Secretariat and not members of the Commission (according to the minister’s dissociative definition), shall be paid the same amount of money as, to borrow the minister’s word, the commissioners. In accordance with section 14(2), the Act only provides that “members of the Commission and the Secretariat shall be remunerated subject to the relevant laws and regulations” (URT, 2012, p. 12). Therefore, it is still unclear whether the two members of the Secretariat are supposed to receive the same amount of allowance as Commission members. Thus, while Mr Lissu could be guilty of misquotation, the minister has not provided conclusive argument for justifying paying members of the Secretariat the same amount of money as commissioners.

Second instance of strategic (mis)quotation is taken from the Excerpt 3 below, where Mr Lissu capitalises on only one detail of the (sub)section of the Act in his quotation, leaving out another relevant detail which seems to contradict his argument.

Excerpt 3

MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, hoja ni hiyo kwamba, kwanini wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Tanzania Bara wamechujwana Kamati ya watu wanne

au watano wakati wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya ya Zanzibar wamechaguliwa na wananchi wote. [2] Hiyo ndiyo hoja na naomba hoja hii ijadiliwe kwa sababu tunatengeneza Katiba, hatuwezi tukatengeneza Katiba ambayo wajumbe wake watakaokwenda kuizungumzia kwenye Wilaya ni watu waliopitishwa kwenye mchujo. [3] Kama nilivyosema ni kwamba Ward C za Tanzania Bara over 80% ni za CCM, ndiyo hali halisi! [4] Sasa kama ukitumia utaratibu huo maana yake ni kwamba waliopitishwa wote ni wanaCCM. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti jambo la mwisho, kuhusiana na hoja hii ni kwamba, Sheria imesema wazi, katika kifungu cha 17 (8) kilisema Tume itabuni utaratibu unaofanana utakaotumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano katika ukusanyaji nauchambuzi wa maoni, uendeshaji wa Mabaraza na uandaaji wa report. [6] Hii ndiyo mandate ya Tume, [7] Tume haikuambiwa itutengenezee utaratibu ambao watu wanakwenda kuchujwa na kikundi cha watu wanne au watano. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013) HON. TUNDU A.M. LISSU: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, that is the argument; why members of the [district] constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania were screened by a committee consisting of four or five people whereas members of the district constitutional fora in Zanzibar were elected by all citizens? [2] That is the point and I request that this issue be discussed because we are writing the constitution, we cannot write the constitution where members, who will go to talk about it at the district level, are the people who have been obtained through a screening [process]. [3] As I have said, more than 80% of the Ward Cs in Mainland Tanzania are dominated by the CCM; this is the reality! [4] Thus, if you employ such a methodology, it means all members who are selected are CCM members. [5] Honourable Chairperson, the last thing concerning this motion is that the Act has pointed out clearly in section 17(8), it says the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies which will be used in both parts of the United republic in the collection and analysis of public opinions, the conduct of fora and writing of the report. [6] This is the Commission's mandate. [7] The Commission was not told to devise a methodology where people are screened by a group of four or five people.

In Excerpt 3 above, Mr Lissu argues against the methodology for the selection of members of the district constitutional fora (henceforward the fora) in Mainland Tanzania, as indicated in line [1]. Specifically, the opposition spokesperson questions the selection of members of the fora by the Ward Development Committees (WDCs), claiming that it is against the provision of the Act on how members of the fora should be selected. Implicitly, Mr Lissu seems to reinforce the argument that it was unreasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies for members of the fora. His main argument against making WDCs electoral bodies is that, as expressed in line [3], over 80% of WDCs in Mainland Tanzania are dominated by CCM members, adding in line [4] that, if WDCs are made electoral bodies, all the selected members of the fora will be CCM members or only the candidates who are affiliated with CCM will be selected as members of the fora. Consequently, Mr Lissu implies that such CCM-affiliated members of the fora will make decisions which favour the incumbent ruling party in the process of writing the new constitution. In order to further defend his claim, Mr Lissu attempts to apply authority argumentation by quotation. He seems to quote one of the (sub)sections of the Act. Specifically, in lines [5-6], he maintains that (sub)section 17(8) of the Act clearly provides that the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies that will be applicable in each part of the Union in the collection of public opinions, the conduct of fora, and writing of the report. He concludes his argumentation in line [7], where he argues that, in accordance with the Act, the

Commission was not directed to devise a methodology where members of the fora will be screened out by a group of four or five people through WDCs. This argument suggests that what the Commission did is against the Act.

Although Mr Lissu provided the right quotation of the cited provision of the Act in the confrontation stage (Msagalla, 2020), in Excerpt 3 above he strategically quotes only the detail of the subsection that supports his argumentation and ignores other important detail of the subsection which seems to contradict his position. In this context, Mr Lissu's quotation functions as a presentational device. This presentational device seems to realise a strategic (mis)quotation which could constitute a manipulation of propositional content of the referred provision of the Act. The (sub)section 17(8) of the Act actually provides that:

In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies, except where the circumstances require

otherwise, (italic; my emphasis) that would be applicable in each part of the United Republic in the collection and analysis of public opinions, the conduct of fora and writing of the report (URT, 2012). The italicised part of the subsection refers to the provision of the Act which was strategically omitted by Mr Lissu in his quotation. Mr Lissu's strategic omission of the provision could be intended to strengthen his claim that the Commission was supposed to apply the same methodology in the selection of members of the fora in Mainland Tanzania as it did in Zanzibar and not using the same methodology is against the Act. Members of the fora in Zanzibar were directly elected by all people (who attended the election meetings) at Shehia level without being screened out by WDCs (Msagalla, 2020). Although members of the fora in Mainland Tanzania were also elected by all people (who attended election meetings) at village or Mtaa level, they were then screened out by a group of four to five people who form WDCs; only members who passed the WDCs' screening process were selected as members of the fora in Mainland Tanzania while all members who were elected by all people at Shehia level automatically became members of the fora in Zanzibar (Msagalla, 2020). Thus, Mr Lissu's strategic omission of the provision of the Act further suggests that the use of WDCs as electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania was intended to favour the ruling party in the constitutional review process and safeguard its political interests because most WDC members are CCM cadres. However, Mr Lissu's omitted provision of the Act is brought to light by the Attorney General (hereafter AG) as he challenges Mr Lissu's claim in Excerpt 4 below.

Excerpt 4

(a) MWANASHERIA MKUU WA SERIKALI: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kifungu ambacho Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu amekielekeza kinachoipa mamlaka Tume kufanya haya, ni kifungu kidogo cha nane cha kifungu kikubwa cha kumi na saba na naomba nikisome kwa urefu kwa sababu Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu amekisoma kuanzia katikati. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, amesema hivi: "Isipokuwa kama mazingira yatahitaji vinginevyo katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake, Tume itabuni utaratibu unaofanana ambao utatumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano katika ukusanyaji na uchambuzi wa maoni ya wananchi, uendeshaji wa Mabaraza na uandaaji wa ripoti". [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, usianze kusoma katikati, mazingira yanayozungumzwa hapa ni yapi? [4] Kwa upande wa Zanzibar ngazi za mitaa kuanzia Shehia [...] ambapo ndipo Sheha ana mamlaka ya kuitisha mikutano. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)



THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the section which Honourable Tundu Lissu has focused on which gives the Commission the mandate to do all this is the subsection (8) of section (17) and allow me to read it at length since Honourable Tundu Lissu has read it starting from the middle. [2] Honourable Chairperson, it says that: "Unless the circumstances require otherwise, in the performance of its functions, the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies which will be applicable in each part of the United Republic [of Tanzania] in the collection and analysis of public opinions, in the conduct of fora and writing of the report". [3] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, a person shouldn't start reading from the middle of the section; what kinds of circumstances are being referred to here?[4]In Zanzibar, the local government levels start at Shehia [...] where a Sheha has the mandate to convene meetings.

(b) [

1] Ngazi ya Wadi au Ward ambayo ni sawa na Kata kwa Tanzania Bara haina mikutano ya kisheria kwa mujibu wa sheria namba moja ya Mamlaka ya Tawala za Mikoa ya Zanzibar ya mwaka 1998. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara, kwa busara za Tume, kuna utaratibu wa Kiserikali na huo ndiyo uliotumika. [3] Sasa hapa hoja ni hii kwamba, je, katika kufanya hivi Tume ilifanya makosa? [4] Jibu lenu ni kwamba ni ndiyo na ni kweli kwa sababu kila mtu ana kichwa na hapa tupo wengi. [5] Kama ungekuwa wewe ungefanya hivyo, lakini Tume siyo wewe, bali Tume imefanya vile ilivyofanya. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, naonakwamba, Tume haijafanyakosa lolote na imefanya kazi hizi kwa mujibu wa sheria. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] A Wadi level which is equivalent to the ward level in Mainland Tanzania doesn't have statutory meetings in accordance with the Zanzibar Regional Administration Authority Act No. 1 of 1998. (Applause) [2] Honourable Chairperson, in Mainland Tanzania, with the Commission's sagacity, there is a governmental procedure and that is the one which was used. [3] Thus, here the issue is: did the Commission make a mistake in doing this? [4] Your answer is yes and it is true because here everybody has a head and we are many here.[5] If it were you, you would do so, but the Commission is not you; the Commission has done what it has done. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, I see that the Commission has not made any mistake and it has performed its functions in accordance with the Act. [...]

In Excerpt 5 above, the AG advances argumentation in favour of the methodology in the selection of members of the fora in Mainland Tanzania and claims that the Commission applied the governmental procedure in the selection, as indicated in part (b), line [2]. The AG implicitly suggests that it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania. In order to further support his claim, the AG quotes (sub)section 17(8) of the Act and he accuses Mr Lissu of misquotation of the provision. It should be recalled that, in his argument, as presented in Excerpt 4, Mr Lissu quoted only part of the subsection that supports his argumentation and strategically left out of consideration another important detail which seems to contradict his position. The part of the subsection that was strategically left out is "except where the circumstances require otherwise". Thus, the AG explains the circumstances which forced the Commission to apply a different methodology in Mainland Tanzania. The AG implicitly suggests that Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania have different governing systems. In part (b), line [1], the AG further argues that, according

to the Zanzibar Regional Administration Authority Act No. 1 of 1998, Zanzibar does not have statutory electoral meetings at Wadi level, because statutory meetings are held at Shehia level, where a Sheha has the mandate to convene such meetings, as indicated in (a) [4]. In part (b), lines [3-6], the AG also argues that, although others may think that the Commission made a mistake (in making WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania), the Commission did not make any mistake in doing so, because the Commission had performed its functions in accordance with the Act. The AG maintains that the Commission's decision to use the governmental procedure (making WDCs electoral bodies) is based on their wisdom, implying that the Commission's decision was right.

Although Mr Lissu's quotation could be considered a manipulation of the actual quotation from the Act, it is still not clear whether the circumstances mentioned by the AG are the very circumstances referred to by the Act. The Act simply refers to the circumstances without specifying the exact circumstances being referred to. This could create a loophole for an interpreter to include any circumstances even those which are not meant by the Act. Besides, Mr Lissu has already argued that the ruling systems between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are basically the same. Thus, the argument advanced by the AG to defend the use of different methodologies between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is still not conclusive.

The third instance of strategic (mis)quotation is taken from Excerpt 5 below, where an MP from the ruling party allegedly quotes the CHADEMA's election manifesto (2010-2015) in order to criticise and accuse them of misleading the public.

Excerpt 5

MHE. JASSON S. RWEIKIZA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, nimemsikia Msemaji wa Kambi Rasmi ya CHADEMA, [2] yeye anasema Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani, [3] mimi nasema siyo ya Upinzani ya CHADEMA. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, anazungumzia Mabaraza ya Katiba, Tume, [5] ninamshangaa sana ni kwanini anapenda kupotosha. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, anapenda kupotosha umma kwa sababu wao walisema wakiingia madarakani siku 100 na Katiba Mpya, [7] wangeipata wapi? [8] Siku mpya wangeipata wapi Katiba? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. JASSON S. RWEIKIZA: [...] [1] Honourable Speaker, I heard the spokesperson of the official CHADEMA camp. [2] He calls it the official opposition camp, [3] [but] I say it is not an opposition [camp]; it is a CHADEMA [camp]. (Applause) [4] Honourable Speaker, he talks about the [district] constitutional fora, the Commission. [5] I am very surprised by him; why does he like to mislead [the public]? (Applause) [6] Honourable Speaker, he likes misleading the public because they [also] said, if they get into power, they will have a new constitution within the first 100 days. [7] Where would they get it from? [8] Where would they get the constitution from? (Applause)

In Excerpt 5 above, Mr Rweikiza implicitly argues in favour of the conduct of the fora or selection of members of the fora. He suggests that the opposition's standpoint and related argumentation against the selection of members of the fora are misleading and should not be accepted. In support of this claim, Mr Rweikiza attempts to apply authority argumentation by quotation. He claims that CHADEMA once said, if they got into power, they would complete the constitutional review process within the first 100 days. In his argument, Mr Rweikiza seems to quote one of the statements from CHADEMA's election manifesto (2010-2015). However, in Excerpt 6, Mr Rweikiza's supposed

authority argumentation by quotation is put into question by an opposition MP from CHADEMA, Ms Sabreena Sungura.

Excerpt 6

MHE. SABREENA H. SUNGURA: [...] [1] Kwanza kabisa, napenda kuweka kumbukumbu sawa kwamba, mchangiaji wa kwanza amepotosha umma kwa kusema Chama cha CHADEMA kilisema kitakamilisha mchakato wa Katiba ndani ya siku 100. [2] Sivyoy, Ilani ya CHADEMA ilisema itaanza mchakato wa marekebisho ya Katiba ndani ya siku 100. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)  
HON. SABREENA H. SUNGURA: [...] [1] First of all, I would like to put the records right; the first contributor has misled the public by saying that CHADEMA said it would complete the constitutional review process within [the first] 100 days. [2] That is not true; CHADEMA's manifesto stipulates that [CHADEMA] will start the constitutional review process within [the first] 100 days. While in Excerpt 5 Mr Rweikiza accuses CHADEMA, and Mr Lissu, in particular, of misleading the electorate about the selection of members of the fora and the constitutional review process in general, in Excerpt 6 above Ms Sungura accuses Mr Rweikiza of misleading the public about the CHADEMA's statement on how they would handle the constitutional review process if elected. Specifically, Ms Sungura accuses Mr Rweikiza of misquotation and manipulation of the propositional content of CHADEMA's statement about how they would coordinate the constitutional review process if elected. She refutes Mr Rweikiza's statement that CHADEMA said they would complete the constitutional review process within the first 100 days since taking office. According to the CHADEMA's election manifesto, she maintains, the party would start (not complete) the process within the first 100 days since taking office. This counterargument also demonstrates authority argumentation by quotation. In fact, CHADEMA's election manifesto (CHADEMA, 2010, p. 55) stipulates that:

[...] hatua ya kwanza itakayochukuliwa na CHADEMA ndani ya siku 90 tangu kuchaguliwa kwake ni kuanzisha mara moja mchakato wa kubadilisha katiba[...].” (CHADEMA's Election Manifesto, 2010-2015)

“[...] the first step which will be taken by CHADEMA within [the first] 90 days after being elected is to immediately instigate the constitutional review process [...].” (CHADEMA's Election Manifesto, 2010-2015)

This actual quotation from CHADEMA's election manifesto (2010-2015) suggests that Mr Rweikiza's 'strategic authority argumentation by quotation' is fallacious and constitutes a manipulation of the propositional content of CHADEMA's statement about the new constitution process in their 2010-2015 election manifesto. Thus, Mr Rweikiza's strategic (mis)quotation constitutes not only a derailment of strategic manoeuvring but also a violation of the argumentation scheme rule (Msagalla, 2020). This strategic (mis)quotation could be intended to present CHADEMA and Mr Lissu in particular as politicians who cannot be trusted because they are inconsistent with their statements. With this discussion move, Mr Rweikiza is in fact shifting the burden of proof from his party (CCM) to Mr Lissu or his party (CHADEMA), which is fallacious. Based on the critical discussion at hand, it is the CCM government who are supposed to defend the standpoint that the constitutional review process, including the conduct of fora, was coordinated according to the Act. The question whether CHADEMA could complete the constitutional review process within 100 days is beyond the critical discussion at hand.

The last instance of strategic (mis)quotation is reconstructed from

Excerpt 7 below. Contrary to the previous three instances, this excerpt comes from the parliamentary debate on the annual ministerial budget speech by the then Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children in the 2015/16 fiscal year, where the then deputy minister, Dr Pindi Chana, attempts to quote Mwalimu Julius Nyerere as she responds to various issues raised by MPs in their contributions to the debate.

Excerpt 7

NAIBU WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [...] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika Hotuba ya

Kambi ya Upinzani wamenukuu sana maneno ya Mwalimu, Baba wa Taifa na mimi kwa heshima kubwa naomba ninukuu maneno ya Mwalimu wakati anang'atuka alisema, "Nchi yetu bila CCM itayumba." (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

DEPUTY MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [...] Honourable Chairperson, in their speech, the Opposition Camp have quoted Mwalimu, the Father of Nation, a great deal. With much respect, I would also like to quote Mwalimu's words when stepping down; he said,

"Without CCM, the country will become unstable.

In Excerpt 7 above, the deputy minister, Dr Pindi Chana, allegedly quotes one of the famous statements made by the Tanzania's Father of the Nation, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, when stepping down as Tanzanian president in 1985 (Fouéré, 2015). She claims that Mwalimu Nyerere said that "without CCM, the country will become unstable". However, Dr Chana's quotation of Mwalimu Nyerere's political statement could be a misquotation because the Swahili adjective *imara* (solid/strong) is strategically omitted from the quotation. According to Fouéré (2015: 47), Mwalimu Nyerere's actual words were "without a solid CCM, the country will become unstable" ("*bila CCM imara nchi itayumba*"). This suggests that Dr Chana's strategic (mis)quotation constitutes a manipulation of Mwalimu Nyerere's actual words and her supposedly authority argumentation by quotation is thus fallacious, as it does not only violate the argumentation scheme rule but it also realises a derailment of strategic manoeuvring from the perspective of pragmadialectics (van Eemeren, 2018). This strategic (mis)quotation could be intended to create a fairly misleading impression that CCM is the only political party in Tanzania which should continue being in power or ruling the country; otherwise, the country will become unstable.

### **Conclusion**

Although quotation is widely used in parliamentary debates to support or attack MPs' political standpoints and related argumentation, parliamentary quotation could be manipulative and fallacious. This article indicates that MPs' strategic (mis)quotation in the Tanzanian parliamentary debates may violate the argumentation scheme rule or constitute derailments of strategic manoeuvring from the perspective of pragma-dialectics. Such strategic (mis)quotation which violates the argumentation scheme rule and realises derailments of strategic manoeuvring could be manipulative or deceptive and thus fallacious. The findings further suggest that MPs' political argumentation in Tanzanian parliamentary discourse should not be taken for granted as they can be manipulative or even deceptive. Such political argumentation needs critical scrutiny to reasonably establish whether members of parliament implicitly (or explicitly) observe the



dialectical standards for sound argumentation through their use of quotation because strategic (mis)quotation may be employed to manipulate the propositional content of the actual quotation or even deceive the arguer's political adversaries and the electorate, and the strategic authority argumentation by quotation may thus be fallacious. It has also been observed that strategic (mis)quotations in the Tanzanian parliamentary argumentation may have various political motives in favour of the relevant political group.

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